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Abstract	
Individual-level	data	 require	protection	 from	unauthorised	access	 to	 safeguard	 confidentiality	
and	 security	 of	 sensitive	 information.	 Risks	 of	 disclosure	 are	 evaluated	 through	 privacy	 risk	
assessments	 and	 are	 controlled	 or	 minimised	 before	 data	 sharing	 and	 integration.	 The	
evolution	from	‘Micro	Data	Laboratory’	traditions	(i.e.	access	in	controlled	physical	locations)	to	
‘Open	 Data’	 (i.e.	 sharing	 individual-level	 data)	 drives	 the	 development	 of	 efficient	
anonymisation	 methods	 and	 protection	 controls.	 Effective	 anonymisation	 techniques	 should	
increase	 the	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 re-identification	 while	 retaining	 data	 utility,	 allowing	
informative	data	analysis.	‘Probabilistic	anonymisation’	is	one	such	technique,	which	alters	the	
data	 by	 addition	 of	 random	 noise.	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 describe	 the	 implementation	 of	 one	
probabilistic	 anonymisation	 technique	 into	 an	 operational	 software	 written	 in	 R	 and	 we	
demonstrate	 its	 applicability	 through	 application	 to	 analysis	 of	 asthma-related	 data	 from	 the	
ALSPAC	cohort	study.	The	software	is	designed	to	be	used	by	data	managers	and	users	without	
the	requirement	of	advanced	statistical	knowledge.	
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Introduction	
Data	 custodians	 managing	 longitudinal	 study	
data	 resources	 use	 a	 variety	 of	 policies	 and	
processes	 to	 manage	 risks	 to	 participant	
confidentiality	and	data	security	when	sharing	data.	
This	 can	 form	 a	 means	 to	 help	 meet	 legal	
requirements	 and	 also	 a	 component	 of	 wider	
strategies	 to	 retain	participant	 trust	and	 the	public	
acceptability	 of	 research	 (Carter,	 Laurie,	 &	 Dixon-
Woods,	2015).	Approaches	range	from:	1)	removing	
directly	 identifiable	 information	 (see	 panel	 1	 for	
term	 definitions);	 2)	 only	 providing	 access	 to	
accredited	 users;	 3)	 allocating	 (project-specific)	
pseudo	IDs	to	each	subject;	4)	making	adjustments	
to	 outlying	 values	 and	 small	 cell	 counts;	 5)	 sub-
setting	 datasets	 to	 only	 include	 data	 required	 for	
specific	investigations;	6)	transforming	data	through	
complex	 statistical	 processes	 that	 mask	 or	 block	
access	 to	 the	underlying	 individual-level	 data;	 and,	
7)	 sharing	 and	using	 data	within	 secure	 policy	 and	
procedural	 frameworks	 (Elliot,	 Mackey,	 O'Hara,	 &	
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Tudor,	 2016),	 such	as	Data	 Safe	Havens	 (Burton	et	
al.,	2015).	
The	 EU	 General	 Data	 Protection	 Regulation	
(GDPR)	 (European	 Parliament,	 2018),	 through	
national	 implementations	 such	 as	 the	 Data	
Protection	 Act	 2018	 (DPA)	 (UK	 Parliament,	 2018),	
distinguishes	 between	 personal	 data	 and	
anonymous	 data.	 Personal	 data	 is	 defined	 as	
“information	relating	to	natural	persons	who:	a)	can	
be	 identified	 or	who	 are	 identifiable,	 directly	 from	
the	 information	 in	 question;	 or	 b)	 who	 can	 be	
indirectly	 identified	 from	 that	 information	 in	
combination	 with	 other	 information”.	 Therefore,	
personal	 information,	 includes	 data	 with	 direct	
identifier	 variables	 or	 data	 where	 identity	 can	 be	
determined	 through	 linking	 to	 other	 readily	
available	 information.	 This	 classification	 is	
important	as	the	safeguards	required	for	the	use	of	
personal	 information	 are	 far	 more	 stringent	 than	
the	 safeguards	 required	 for	 the	use	of	 anonymous	
data.	 The	 DPA	 –	 even	 when	 research	 exemptions	
apply	–	requires	that	individuals	are	informed	of	the	
use	 of	 their	 personal	 information,	 and	 that	 the	
security	 of	 the	 data	 is	 maintained	 through	 the	
research	 process.	 Furthermore,	 even	 when	 these	
safeguards	are	in	place,	the	DPA	requires	that	data	
are	de-identified	as	soon	in	the	research	process	as	
possible	–	 ideally	prior	 to	 the	point	when	 the	data	
are	 provided	 to	 researchers.	 In	 contrast,	
anonymous	data	do	not	fall	under	the	scope	of	the	
DPA	 (or	 GDPR)	 and	 are	 therefore	 exempt	 from	
these	requirements.		
Under	the	new	DPA	2018	legislation,	longitudinal	
research	 studies	 are	 required	 (Article	 35	 of	 the	
GDPR)	 to	 consider	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 data	
processing	 and	 use.	 Through	 conducting	 ‘Data	
Protection	 Impact	 Assessments’,	 data	 custodians	
will	 assess	 risks	 (e.g.	 loss	 of	 control	 of	 data	 when	
sharing	with	external	 research	users)	and	will	have	
to	 implement	 controls	 to	mitigate	 these	 risks	 (e.g.	
effectively	 anonymising	 the	 data).	 Given	 the	
pressures	 to	 share	 data,	 it	 seems	 inevitable	 that	
DPA	 2018	 will	 provide	 a	 new	 impetus	 for	 data	
guardians	to	explore	options	for	effective	disclosure	
control.	 As	 a	 community,	 the	 data	 guardians	 of	
longitudinal	 studies	 should	 work	 together	 to	
understand	the	options	available,	 the	 impact	these	
may	have	on	research	utility	and	how	to	implement	
anonymisation	strategies	effectively.	The	risk	of	not	
doing	 this	 is	 that	 poorly	 executed	 anonymisation	
strategies	 reveal	 sensitive	 information	 about	
participants	and	bring	the	research	community	into	
disrepute.	While	we	are	fortunate	that	there	are	no	
known	 examples	 of	 this	 within	 the	 longitudinal	
research	 community,	 we	 should	 take	 note	 of	
parallel	examples	of	poor	practice	(e.g.	in	2014,	the	
New	 York	 Taxi	 &	 Limousine	 Commission	 released	
data	on	173	million	 individual	 journeys,	 yet	a	poor	
anonymisation	 strategy	 meant	 that	 individuals	
could	 easily	 be	 re-identified	 and	 their	 sensitive	
information	breached	(Pandurangan,	2014)).	
	
Panel	1:	Disclosure	Control	Terminology	
Data	Custodians:	authorised	individuals/entities	who	manage	and	share	study	data.	While	(typically)	authorised	
to	view	identifiable	data,	there	is	a	risk	they	can	accidentally	disclose	data	through	data	breaches	or	accidentally	
and	spontaneously	identify	a	participant.	
Accredited	User:	a	bona-fide	professional	working	for	a	bona-fide	institution	for	a	bona-fide	purpose	who	can	be	
expected	 to	 operate	 professionally	 and	 to	 not	 deliberately	 disclose	 information.	 The	 potential	 for	 accidental	
disclosure	remains.	Similar	to	the	‘Safe	Researcher’	concept.	
External	Attacker:	an	 individual	who	will	attempt	 to	deliberately	disclose	participant	 information	 for	malicious	
means.	
Individual	of	Interest:	the	participant(s)	targeted	by	an	external	attacker.	
Direct	 Identifier(s):	 a	 data	 item	 that	 on	 its	 own	 could	 identify	 an	 individual	 (e.g.	 name,	 full	 date	 of	 birth,	 full	
address,	health	or	other	service	ID	number).	The	GDPR/DPA	2018	has	expanded	the	legal	definition	of	personal	
identifiers	to	include	genetic	sequence	information	(when	used	for	linkage)	as	well	as	digital	network	identifiers	
(such	as	internet	‘IP’	addresses).	
Indirect-Identifier(s)	 (aka	 Quasi-Identifiers):	 social	 or	 health	 variables	 with	 (context-specific)	 potential	 to	
disclose	 an	 individual’s	 identity	 (i.e.	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 known	 or	 discoverable	 to	 an	 external	 attacker	 or	
spontaneously	recognisable	to	someone	who	knows	the	individual),	for	example:	parity,	height,	weight,	disease	
status,	occupation	categories.	
Non-Identifier(s):	 variables	 with	 exceptionally	 limited	 potential	 to	 disclose	 an	 individual’s	 identity.	 These	 will	
tend	to	be	transient	values	(e.g.	blood	pressure	readings).	
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Achieving	 anonymity	 in	 a	 dataset	 is	 challenging	
and	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	much	population	
discovery	 science,	 particularly	 that	 informed	 by	
longitudinal	 studies,	 relies	 on	 broad	 datasets	 of	
granular	 detailed	 individual-level	 data.	 These	 data	
are	 ideal	 for	 assessing	 life-course	 associations	 and	
controlling	for	socially	mediated	status,	yet	are	also	
ideally	suited	–	given	their	rich	and	typically	unique	
patterns	 of	 values	 –	 for	 identifying	 participants’	
real-world	 identities.	 This	 situation	 is	 further	
complicated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 some	 indirect	
identifiers	have	research	value	(e.g.	age,	gender),	so	
that	 the	 different	 classes	 of	 identifiers	 (direct,	
indirect,	 non)	 often	 cannot	 be	 viewed	 in	 isolation	
and	 that	 identification	 risk	 is	 context	 specific.	
Existing	approaches	to	controlling	for	this	risk,	such	
as	 k-anonymisation	 (El	 Emam	 &	 Dankar,	 2008;	
Sweeney,	2002),	attempt	to	mask	these	patterns	of	
uniqueness	 through	 supressing	 and	 aggregating	
data	 values.	 While	 this	 technique	 offers	 some	
protection	to	disclosure	risk	(Domingo-Ferrer,	Sebé,	
&	Castellà-Roca,	 2004),	 it	 also	 has	 the	potential	 to	
impact	the	utility	of	the	data	to	inform	the	research	
question.	
Goldstein	 and	 Shlomo	 (Goldstein	 &	 Shlomo,	
2018)	 suggest	 the	 use	 of	 a	 probabilistic	
anonymisation	 approach	 to	 perturb	 the	 data	
through	the	addition	of	random	noise	to	some	or	all	
variables	 in	 the	dataset.	 In	 this	 approach,	 the	 risks	
posed	 by	 an	 external	 ‘attacker’	who	wished	 to	 re-
identify	an	individual	of	interest	from	a	dataset,	are	
assessed.	In	this	risk	scenario,	it	is	assumed	that	the	
attacker	 independently	knows	the	 individual’s	data	
values	 for	 some	 or	 all	 the	 identifying	 variables	
within	 the	 dataset.	 Using	 this	 information,	 the	
attacker	could	‘link’	to	the	target	individual’s	record	
using	 the	 unique	 patterns	 in	 their	 data,	 and	
therefore	 learn	new	information	about	that	person	
from	 their	 associated	 attribute	 variables.	 To	 avoid	
such	 identification,	 Goldstein	 and	 Shlomo	 propose	
that	sufficient	noise	 is	generated	and	added	to	the	
identifying	variables	to	disguise	their	values	as	they	
appear	 to	 any	 attacker.	 From	 the	 research	
perspective,	 the	 accredited	 user	 is	 provided	 with	
sufficient	 information	 to	 remove	 the	effects	of	 the	
noise	 during	 the	 analysis	 stage	 to	 recover	 the	
underlying	data	structure	and	therefore	to	produce	
consistent	 parameter	 estimates.	 This	 is	 done	
through	 the	use	of	 statistical	 techniques	 for	 fitting	
models	 with	 measurement	 errors	 (see	 Goldstein,	
Browne,	&	Charlton,	2017).	
This	paper,	in	contrast	to	Goldstein	and	Shlomo’s	
methodological	 manuscript,	 presents	 a	 pragmatic	
perspective	 with	 worked	 examples.	 To	 apply	
Goldstein	 and	 Shlomo’s	 methodology,	 we	 have	
written	 an	 operational	 software	 package	 using	 the	
open-source	 statistical	 programming	 language	 R.	
We	 use	 data	 from	 participants	 of	 the	 Avon	
Longitudinal	Study	of	Parents	and	Children	(ALSPAC)	
birth	 cohort	 study	 (Boyd	 et	 al.,	 2013)	 to	
demonstrate	 the	 feasibility	 and	 practicality	 of	 the	
approach.	 For	 illustration	 of	 the	 method,	 we	
anonymise	asthma-related	data	by	adding	differing	
degrees	of	noise.	We	then	perform	three	exemplar	
analyses	 on	 the	 differing	 versions	 of	 anonymised	
data,	 treating	 the	 noise	 as	 measurement	 error.	
Finally,	 we	 assess	 how	 well	 the	 true	 model	
parameters	 are	 retrieved	 and	 we	 compare	 the	
differing	risks	of	residual	disclosure	 in	the	different	
datasets.	
Software	package	
We	have	developed	two	functions	in	R	(Avraam,	
2018);	the	function	probAnon(),	which	adds	noise	to	
an	 input	dataset,	and	 the	 function	hRanks(),	which	
generates	a	re-identification	risk	measure.	Software	
to	carry	out	the	data	modelling	has	been	written	in	
MATLAB	(Mathworks,	2016).	
The	probAnon()	function	
The	 function	 probAnon()	 applies	 probabilistic	
anonymisation	 to	 an	 input	 dataset.	 The	 algorithm	
first	 separates	 the	 input	data	 into	 two	 subset	data	
frames,	one	for	the	continuous	(numerical)	and	one	
for	 the	 categorical	 (integer	 or	 factor)	 variables.	
Then,	normally	distributed	random	noise	with	user-
specified	variances	 is	 added,	 independently,	 to	 the	
continuous	 and	 categorical	 variables.	 For	
continuous	 variables,	 the	 variance	 of	 noise	 is	
specified	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 each	 variable’s	
observed	 variance	 in	 the	 argument	weights,	which	
is	 a	 vector	 (w1,	 …,	 ws)	 of	 length	 s,	 where	 s	 is	 the	
number	 of	 continuous	 variables	 in	 the	 input	
dataset.	 If	 the	 user	 does	 not	 specify	 the	 vector	 of	
weights,	each	weight	is	set	to	0.1	by	default,	which	
means	that	the	variance	of	the	added	noise	is	equal	
to	the	10%	of	the	observed	variance	of	the	variable.	
The	 random	 noise	 added	 to	 each	 binary	 variable	
follows	 a	 normal	 distribution	 with	 zero	 mean	 and	
variance	 specified	 by	 the	 user.	 The	 added	 noise	
therefore,	 converts	 binary	 data	 to	 continuous.	 For	
the	‘noisy’	continuous	form	of	0–1	binary	variables,	
the	algorithm	then	truncates	any	negative	values	to	
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0	and	any	values	greater	than	1	to	1.	This	step	is	not	
strictly	 necessary,	 particularly	 since	 it	 tends	 to	
increase	 identifiability	 risk,	 but	may	 be	 convenient	
for	 presentational	 purposes	 and	 serves	 in	 the	
present	 context	 to	 present	 a	 worst	 case	 scenario.	
The	output	is	then	the	input	dataset	plus	the	added	
noise.	 In	 addition,	 the	 argument	 seed,	 allows	 the	
user	 to	 set	 a	 certain	 random	number	 generator.	 If	
this	 argument	 is	 not	 specified,	 the	 function	 bases	
the	 seed	 parameter	 on	 the	 local	 time	 (as	
determined	by	the	computer’s	internal	clock).	
The	hRanks()	function	
The	 function	 hRanks()	 calculates	 a	 re-
identification	 risk	 measure	 (the	 h-rank	 index)	 of	
anonymised	 data	 using	 the	 method	 proposed	 by	
Goldstein	and	Shlomo	 (Goldstein	&	Shlomo,	2018).	
The	 function	 takes	 as	 input	 arguments	 the	original	
dataset	 and	 the	 anonymised	 dataset	 (both	 having	
the	 same	dimensions).	The	conceptual	basis	of	 the	
h-rank	 index	 is	 to	 estimate	 the	 probability	 of	 an	
attacker	 being	 successful	 in	 identifying	 their	
individual	 of	 interest	 within	 the	 anonymised	
dataset.	 We	 assume	 that	 a	 potential	 attacker	 will	
have	 access	 to	 some	 information	 about	 an	
individual	 they	 are	 targeting	 (we	 note	 that	 this	
assumption	 is	 also	 explicit	 within	 Data	 Protection	
legislation	 and	 represents	 a	 data	 guardian’s	 worst	
case	scenario).	
We	describe	 the	 logic	 of	 this	 function	here	 and	
illustrate	 this	 in	 panel	 2.	 Initially	 (step	 1),	 the	
algorithm	 calculates	 the	 Euclidean	 distances	
(defined	 as	 the	 square	 root	 of	 the	 sum	 of	 the	
squares	 of	 the	 differences	 between	 the	
corresponding	coordinates	of	two	vectors)	between	
each	 row	 in	 the	 true	 dataset	 and	 all	 rows	 in	 the	
noisy	 dataset	 (i.e.	 a	 pair-wise	 comparison	 that	
ultimately	 assesses	 all	 possible	pairs).	 It	 then	 (step	
2),	ranks	the	distances	to	determine	how	close	each	
true	 record	 is	 to	 every	 record	 in	 the	 noisy	 dataset	
(i.e.	 a	 1	 to	 n	 comparison	 where	 n	 is	 the	 total	
number	 of	 records),	 and	 identifies	 the	 position	 of	
the	closest	record	(i.e.	the	record	that	corresponds	
to	 rank	 equal	 to	 one).	 We	 use	 the	 standard	
competition	 ranking	 method	 (where	 ties	 are	
allocated	 the	 same	 rank,	 and	 the	 next	 allocated	
rank	 is	 offset	 by	 the	 number	 of	 ties,	 e.g.	 “1224”),	
which	 is	 performed	 by	 the	 R	 function	 rank()	 with	
the	 argument	 ties.method=‘min’.	 In	 step	 3,	 the	
algorithm	 generates	 a	 duplicate	 copy	 of	 the	 true	
dataset	 and	 computes	 the	 Euclidean	 distances	
between	each	row	in	the	true	dataset	with	all	rows	
in	 the	 copy	 of	 the	 true	 dataset	 and	 ranks	 them	 in	
order	of	distance	(i.e.	a	1	to	n	comparison	similar	to	
step	2).	In	step	4,	the	algorithm	identifies	the	ranks	
of	the	distances	calculated	in	step	3	at	the	locations	
specified	 in	 step	 2.	 Finally	 (step	 5),	 the	 algorithm	
calculates	 the	 difference	 (h-rank	 index)	 between	
the	ranks	located	in	step	4	and	the	ranks	located	in	
step	2,	and	returns	a	vector	with	those	differences.	
Note	that	the	critical	observations	to	identify	in	step	
2	are	all	 ranked	1	(or	a	tied	equivalent)	as	the	role	
of	step	2	is	to	search	for	the	closest	noisy	record	to	
each	true	record.	 If	h=0	for	any	one	record	that	an	
attacker	has	available	(and	belongs	to	the	dataset),	
then	this	implies	that	the	noisy	record	identified	by	
the	 attacker	 as	 the	 closest	 one	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
distance	metric,	is	in	fact	the	true	one.	The	average	
value	 of	 h-rank	 indices	 provides	 a	 metric	 of	
disclosiveness.	 The	 larger	 the	 average	 value	 of	 h,	
the	greater	the	 level	of	unreliability	 in	any	attempt	
to	 disclose	 identity	 through	 exploiting	 a	 given	
individual’s	 known	 pattern	 of	 data	 values.	 Where	
the	 average	 of	 h	 is	 small	 (i.e.	 lower	 than	 an	
acceptable	 threshold	 pre-specified	 by	 the	 study	
data	custodian),	the	probAnon()	function	can	be	re-
used	to	alter	the	data	with	a	higher	level	of	noise	in	
order	 to	 increase	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 re-
identification.	
Some	care	is	needed	where	there	are	more	than	
a	negligible	number	of	tied	distances.	This	will	be	a	
particular	 issue	 with	 categorical,	 including	 binary,	
data.	For	example,	where	a	dataset	consists	of	only	
four	 binary	 indicators,	 there	 are	 only	 16	 possible	
patterns;	meaning	 that	 for	any	given	record	where	
noise	has	been	added	there	will	be	many	tied	rank	
distances.	 For	 an	 attacker,	when	 estimating	h,	 this	
will	 result	 in	 additional	 uncertainty.	 Thus,	 for	
example,	 if	 there	 are	 p	 tied	 ranks	 and	 the	 correct	
true	 record	 is	 among	 these,	 the	 attacker	 will	 be	
confronted	with	p	records	with	h=0,	and	will	be	able	
to	choose	the	correct	one	only	with	probability	1/p.	
To	reflect	this	so	that	we	can	consistently	report	our	
risk	measure	on	the	scale	of	h,	a	very	small	amount	
of	noise	is	added	to	each	of	the	identifiers	in	order	
to	 break	 the	 ties	 and	 so	 that	 the	 true	 record	 will	
therefore	 be	 identified	 as	 the	 closest	 with	
probability	1/p.	 In	 the	present	 implementation	(for	
the	 case	 that	 we	 have	 a	 dataset	 with	 only	
categorical	 variables)	 we	 have	 added,	 for	 all	
categorical	 (binary)	 variables,	 noise	 following	 a	
normal	distribution	with	variance	10!!.	
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Examples	
To	 demonstrate	 the	 feasibility	 of	 the	 software,	
we	show	 its	applicability	 to	childhood	asthma	data	
from	 participants	 in	 ALSPAC;	 a	 longitudinal	 birth	
cohort	 study	 collecting	 information	of	participants’	
life-course	 exposures,	 and	 health,	 social	 and	
wellbeing	 outcomes	 (Boyd	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 ALSPAC	
recruited	 pregnant	 women	 living	 in,	 and	 around,	
the	city	of	Bristol	 (south-west	UK)	–	who	were	due	
to	 deliver	 between	 01/04/91	 and	 31/12/92.	 An	
initial	 total	 of	 14,062	 live-born	 children	 were	
enrolled.	 By	 age	 18,	 the	 enrolled	 sample	 had	
extended	 to	 include	 14,775	 live-born	 individuals	
from	 15,247	 pregnancies.	 The	 assessment	 in	 this	
paper	 was	 conducted	 on	 a	 sample	 of	 15,211	
participants.	 Data	 is	 collected	 via	 questionnaires,	
study	 assessment	 visits,	 biological	 and	 ’omic	
characterisations	 and	 linkage	 to	 routine	 records	
(see:	 www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/researchers/access/	
for	ALSPAC	data	dictionary).		
Ethical	 approval	 for	 ALSPAC	was	 obtained	 from	
the	ALSPAC	Law	and	Ethics	Committee	and	the	NHS	
Research	 Ethics	 Committees.	 The	 variables	 used	 in	
this	 exemplar	 application	 (see	 table	 1)	 were	
selected	 and	 then	 reviewed	 by	 an	 ALSPAC	 data	
custodian	 (author	 AB)	 using	 the	 ALSPAC	 privacy	
impact/risk	 assessment	 template.	 This	 assessment	
(based	 on	 an	 assumption	 that	 a	 potential	 attacker	
had	 some	 access	 to	 real	 information	 about	 their	
target)	 noted	 that	 the	 dataset	 contained	 Direct	
Identifiers	 (study	 ID),	 Indirect	 Identifiers,	 Non-
Identifiers	and	Outcome	variables	(see	table	1).	
	
	
Table	1:	Asthma-related	variables	from	the	ALSPAC	birth	cohort	study.		
Variable	
identification	
Type	 Identifier/	
Outcome	
Missing	
values*	
Explanation	
b650	 binary	 Indirect	 2009	 ever	smoked	(completed	by	mother	at	18	weeks	of	gestation)	
kz021	 binary	 Indirect	 517	 child’s	sex	
kc362	 binary	 Indirect	 4144	 never	exposed	to	passive	smoke	(completed	by	mother	at	15	months)	
kc401	 multi-categorical	 Indirect	 4231	
ever	breast	fed	(completed	by	mother	
at	15	months)	
m2110	 binary	 Non	 7036	
there	is	damp/condensation/	
mould	in	home	(completed	by	mother	
at	7	years	1	month)	
dda_91	 binary	 Outcome	 7053	 doctor	ever	diagnosed	asthma	(completed	by	mother	at	91	months)	
kv1059	 multi-categorical	 Outcome	 7426	
child	had	asthma	in	past	12	months	
(completed	by	mother	at	128	months)	
height_f8	 continuous	 Indirect	 8028	
child's	height	(cm),	(measured	by	
fieldworker	at	‘focus@8’	clinical	
assessment	visit	at	mean	age	103.8	
months)	
weight_f8	 continuous	 Indirect	 8249	
child's	weight	(kg),	(measured	by	
fieldworker	at	‘focus@8’	clinical	
assessment	visit	at	mean	age	103.8	
months)	
raw_fev1_f8	 continuous	 Outcome	 8301	
forced	expiratory	volume	in	1	second,	
(measured	by	fieldworker	at	‘focus@8’	
clinical	assessment	visit	at	mean	age	
103.8	months)	
*The	number	of	missing	values	includes	also	the	‘not	completed’,	‘don’t	know’	and	‘no	response’	answers.	
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We	conducted	a	complete	case	analysis	that	was	
restricted	 to	participants	with	non-missing	data	on	
all	 relevant	 variables.	We	 calculated	 the	 children’s	
body	 mass	 index	 (BMI)	 using	 the	 relationship	BMI = weight ∕ height/100 !.	 We	 then	 created	
three	 separate	 datasets:	 dataset	 A	 with	 the	
variables	 ASTHMA = dda_91,	 SMOKE = kc362,	BREAST FED = kc401	 and	 MOULD = m2110;	
dataset	 B	 with	 the	 variables	 ASTHMA = dda_91,	BMI = weight_f8/ height_f8 !	 and	BREAST FED = kc401;	dataset	C	with	the	variables	FEV1 =  raw_fev1_f8,	 BMI = weight_f8 ∕height_f8 !,	 SEX = kz021	 and	 SMOKE = b650.	
From	 each	 of	 the	 three	 datasets	 we	 removed	 any	
rows	 with	 missing	 values.	 This	 results	 in	 datasets	
with	 6837,	 4975	 and	 5942	 complete	 records	
respectively.	 We	 then	 converted	 the	 multi-
categorical	 variables	 (see	 type	 of	 each	 variable	 in	
table	1)	to	binary	data.	For	the	variable	kc401	(ever	
breast	 fed),	 we	 combined	 together	 the	 categories	
“Yes,	 no	 longer”	 and	 “Yes,	 still”	 and	 replaced	 their	
values	 with	 ones	 while	 we	 replaced	 the	 values	 in	
the	 category	 “No,	 never”	 with	 zeros.	 For	 the	
variable	 kv1059	 (child	 had	 asthma	 in	 past	 12	
months,	 completed	by	mother	at	128	months),	we	
combined	together	the	categories	“Yes,	but	did	not	
see	a	doctor”	and	“Yes,	saw	a	doctor”	and	replaced	
their	values	with	ones	while	we	replaced	the	values	
in	 the	 category	 “No,	 did	not	 have”	with	 zeros.	We	
finally	 generated	 ‘noisy’	 datasets	 for	 each	 true	
dataset	 (A–C)	 using	 the	 probAnon()	 function.	 For	
datasets	 A	 and	 B	 we	 did	 not	 add	 noise	 to	 the	
ASTHMA	 variable,	 which	 is	 used	 as	 the	 response	
variable	 in	 a	 probit	 regression	 model.	 For	 all	 the	
other	variables	we	added	normally	distributed	noise	
with	 zero	 mean	 and	 variance	 equal	 to	 the	 value	
shown	 in	 table	 2.	 We	 did	 not	 consider	 the	 case	
where	 noise	 is	 added	 to	 the	 response	 variable	
where	 this	 is	 binary.	 This	 feature	 is	 described	 in	
Goldstein	 and	 Shlomo	 (Goldstein	 &	 Shlomo,	 2018)	
but	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 implemented	 in	 the	 analysis	
software.	
	
	
	
Table	2:	Variances	of	the	added	noise.	Note	that	for	binary	variables	we	add	different	levels	of	noise.	
Dataset	 Variable	 Type	 True	variance	of	variable	
Variance	of	added	
noise	
A	
ASTHMA	 binary	response	 0.160	 -	
SMOKE	 binary	covariate	 0.231	 0.05,	0.1,	0.2,	0.5	
BREAST	FED	 binary	covariate	 0.171	 0.05,	0.1,	0.2,	0.5	
MOULD	 binary	covariate	 0.244	 0.05,	0.1,	0.2,	0.5	
B	
ASTHMA	 binary	response	 0.109	 -	
BMI	 continuous	covariate	 5.512	 0.55	
BREAST	FED	 binary	covariate	 0.151	 0.05,	0.1,	0.2,	0.5	
C	
FEV1	 continuous	response	 0.069	 0.0069	
BMI	 continuous	covariate	 5.828	 0.58	
SEX	 binary	covariate	 0.250	 0.05,	0.1,	0.2,	0.5	
SMOKE	 binary	covariate	 0.248	 0.05,	0.1,	0.2,	0.5	
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Results	
We	 apply	 regression	 models	 to	 the	 true	 and	
noisy	data	of	each	dataset	(A–C)	and	compare	the	
estimated	 coefficients.	 Each	 regression	 model	 is	
applied	 to	 the	true	data	using	common	functions	
for	 generalised	 linear	models	 (e.g.	glm()	 function	
in	 R)	 and	 to	 the	 noisy	 data	 using	 a	 Bayesian	
Markov	 Chain	 Monte	 Carlo	 (MCMC)	 algorithm	
that	 allows	 the	 recovery	 of	 the	 original	 data	
structure	 (see	 description	 of	 this	 procedure	 in	
(Goldstein	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 We	 have	 not	 run	 full	
simulations	 of	 the	 data.	 We	 note	 that	 a	 true	
simulation	 to	 derive	 population	 estimates	 will	
require	 both	 the	 generation	 of	 a	 model	 using	
assumed	 population	 parameters	 and	 for	 each	 of	
these	 generated	 datasets	 the	 further	 generation	
of	 a	 set	 of	 models	 where	 the	 noise	 is	 sampled	
from	 the	 assumed	 noise	 distribution.	 Goldstein	
and	 Shlomo	 (Goldstein	 &	 Shlomo,	 2018)	 ran	
simulations	 with	 both	 continuous	 and	 binary	
covariates	 that	 pointed	 to	 negligible	 bias	 for	 the	
general	procedure.	
Dataset	A	
Dataset	 A	 consists	 only	 of	 binary	 data	 and	
without	 special	 care	 will	 give	 many	 tied	 rank	
distances.	 To	 illustrate	 this,	 we	 present	 the	
frequencies	 of	 all	 possible	 combinations	 for	 the	
true	values	of	dataset	A	in	table	3.	
We	 see	 from	 table	 3	 that	 the	 smallest	 set	 of	
identical	 combinations	 of	 identifiers	 confronting	
an	attacker	 is	61,	 and	 the	 largest	1691.	We	have	
therefore	used	the	procedure	of	adding	additional	
‘tie-breaking’	noise	and	see	 that	 the	probabilities	
for	 a	 successful	 attack	 are	 still	 acceptably	 small.	
Table	 4	 gives	 the	 estimates	 of	 disclosiveness	 as	
expressed	in	terms	of	ℎ	based	on	100	simulations.	
The	 big	 number	 of	 simulations	 is	 used	 to	
demonstrate	stable	estimates.	
To	analyse	the	data	from	dataset	A,	we	apply	a	
probit	 regression	 model	 where	 the	 asthma	
indicator	 is	 regressed	 on	 smoking,	 breastfeeding	
and	presence	of	mould	probit 𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐻𝑀𝐴 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑆𝑀𝑂𝐾𝐸 +𝛽!(𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇 𝐹𝐸𝐷) + 𝛽!(𝑀𝑂𝑈𝐿𝐷).                    (1)		
The	 estimated	 coefficients	 from	 the	 analysis,	
and	 their	 standard	 errors,	 are	 shown	 in	 table	 5.	
We	 observe	 that	 the	 estimates	 of	 the	 model	
applied	 to	 noisy	 data	 using	 the	 procedure	 that	
removes	 the	 noise	 are	 close	 to	 the	 estimates	 of	
the	model	applied	to	the	true	data	(i.e.	an	overlap	
between	 their	 confidence	 intervals).	
		
	
Table	3.	Frequencies	for	all	possible	combinations	of	values	for	dataset	A.	
ASTHMA	 SMOKE	 BREAST	FED	 MOULD	 Frequency	
0	 0	 0	 0	 380	
0	 0	 0	 1	 181	
0	 0	 1	 0	 1691	
0	 0	 1	 1	 1308	
0	 1	 0	 0	 357	
0	 1	 0	 1	 227	
0	 1	 1	 0	 758	
0	 1	 1	 1	 567	
1	 0	 0	 0	 91	
1	 0	 0	 1	 61	
1	 0	 1	 0	 348	
1	 0	 1	 1	 310	
1	 1	 0	 0	 133	
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Table	4:	Cumulative	probabilities	of	h	for	noisy	dataset	A,	at	10th,	50th	and	90th	percentiles.	No	noise	is	added	
to	 the	 response	 variable.	 Noise	with	 variance	 0.05	 (scenario	 1),	 0.1	 (scenario	 2),	 0.2	 (scenario	 3)	 and	 0.5	
(scenario	4)	is	added	to	all	predictors.	100	simulated	noise	additions	used.	
Scenario	 Percentile	 P(ℎ = 0)	 P(ℎ ≤ 1)	 P(ℎ ≤ 2)	 P(ℎ ≤ 3)	 P(ℎ ≤ 4)	 P(ℎ ≤ 5)	
1	
10%	 0.0265	 0.0286	 0.0307	 0.0327	 0.0343	 0.0369	
50%	 0.0105	 0.0128	 0.0155	 0.0177	 0.0200	 0.0219	
90%	 0.0088	 0.0112	 0.0139	 0.0162	 0.0185	 0.0208	
2	
10%	 0.0230	 0.0250	 0.0275	 0.0301	 0.0326	 0.0340	
50%	 0.0091	 0.0116	 0.0141	 0.0167	 0.0191	 0.0213	
90%	 0.0069	 0.0094	 0.0119	 0.0143	 0.0167	 0.0191	
3	
10%	 0.0221	 0.0239	 0.0253	 0.0273	 0.0281	 0.0300	
50%	 0.0084	 0.0109	 0.0129	 0.0150	 0.0169	 0.0193	
90%	 0.0063	 0.0087	 0.0110	 0.0132	 0.0151	 0.0174	
4	
10%	 0.0143	 0.0156	 0.0165	 0.0175	 0.0182	 0.0189	
50%	 0.0048	 0.0063	 0.0076	 0.0088	 0.0102	 0.0113	
90%	 0.0034	 0.0049	 0.0063	 0.0078	 0.0092	 0.0104	
	
	
Table	5:	Estimated	parameters	and	their	 standard	errors	 for	dataset	A.	The	 first	 row	shows	the	estimated	
coefficients	of	the	model	applied	to	the	true	records	and	scenarios	1–4	show	the	estimated	coefficients	of	
the	model	 applied	 to	 noisy	 data	 using	 procedures	 to	 recover	 the	 data	 structure.	 Note	 that	 the	 response	
variable	was	without	noise	and	noise	with	variance	0.05	(scenario	1),	0.1	(scenario	2),	0.2	(scenario	3)	and	
0.5	 (scenario	 4)	 was	 added	 to	 all	 predictors.	 The	 results	 in	 scenarios	 1–4	 show	 the	means	 of	 50	MCMC	
simulations.	
Scenario	 Data	 𝛽!	(SE)	 𝛽!	(SE)	 𝛽!	(SE)	 𝛽!	(SE)	
	 True	data	 -0.809	(0.043)	 0.124	(0.036)	 -0.131	(0.042)	 0.053	(0.035)	
1	 Noisy	data	 -0.817	(0.018)	 0.115	(0.032)	 -0.114	(0.038)	 0.048	(0.031)	
2	 Noisy	data	 -0.777	(0.042)	 0.115	(0.043)	 -0.167	(0.044)	 0.048	(0.036)	
3	 Noisy	data	 -0.828	(0.031)	 0.062	(0.027)	 -0.063	(0.026)	 0.027	(0.026)	
4	 Noisy	data	 -0.842	(0.024)	 0.040	(0.019)	 -0.027	(0.020)	 0.016	(0.019)	
	
Dataset	B	
Dataset	 B	 includes	 both	 binary	 and	 continuous	
covariates.	 We	 add	 noise	 with	 variance	 equal	 to	
10%	of	the	true	variance	to	BMI	variable	and	noise	
with	 variance	 0.05,	 0.1,	 0.2	 and	 0.5	 to	 the	
breastfeeding	variable.	The	cumulative	probabilities	
of	h	based	on	100	simulations	are	shown	in	table	6.	
We	observe	that	probabilities	of	h	to	be	less	than	a	
certain	 value	 are	 increasing	 with	 the	 increase	 of	
noise	 added	 to	 the	 binary	 variable	 (i.e.	 comparing	
the	 values	 between	 scenario	 1,	 which	 refers	 to	
noise	 with	 variance	 0.05,	 and	 scenario	 4,	 which	
refers	 to	 noise	 with	 variance	 0.5	 added	 to	 the	
binary	 breastfeeding	 variable).	 We	 also	 observe	
higher	 values	 of	 probabilities	 at	 the	 10th	 and	 90th	
percentiles	in	contrast	with	the	lower	values	at	the	
median	 (50th	 percentile).	 In	 addition,	 the	
probabilities	 at	 the	 10th	 percentile	 are	
systematically	 higher	 than	 the	 probabilities	 at	 the	
90th	percentile,	which	is	related	to	the	slightly	right-
skewed	actual	distribution	of	the	continuous	BMI.		
For	 dataset	 B,	 we	 apply	 a	 probit	 regression	
model	where	 the	 asthma	 indicator	 is	 regressed	on	
BMI	and	breastfeeding	probit 𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐻𝑀𝐴 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐵𝑀𝐼 +𝛽! 𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇 𝐹𝐸𝐷 .                                                        (2)		
A	 comparison	 of	 the	 results	 derived	 from	 the	
model	 applied	 to	 the	 true	 and	 the	 noisy	 data	 are	
shown	 in	 table	 7.	 Similarly	 to	 the	 results	 obtained	
from	 dataset	 A,	 we	 observe	 a	 highly	 accurate	
estimation	 of	 the	model	 parameters	 by	 fitting	 the	
model	 to	 the	 noisy	 data	 and	 removing	 the	 noise	
using	MCMC	procedures.		
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Table	6:	Cumulative	probabilities	of	h	for	noisy	dataset	B,	at	10th,	50th	and	90th	percentiles.	No	noise	is	added	
to	the	response	variable.	Noise	with	variance	0.55	was	added	to	BMI	and	noise	with	variance	0.05	(scenario	
1),	0.1	(scenario	2),	0.2	(scenario	3)	and	0.5	(scenario	4)	was	added	to	breastfeeding	variable.	100	simulated	
noise	additions	used	in	computations.	
Scenario	 Percentile	 P(ℎ = 0)	 P(ℎ ≤ 1)	 P(ℎ ≤ 2)	 P(ℎ ≤ 3)	 P(ℎ ≤ 4)	 P(ℎ ≤ 5)	
1	
10%	 0.0071	 0.0136	 0.0191	 0.0246	 0.0299	 0.0356	
50%	 0.0060	 0.0115	 0.0168	 0.0219	 0.0269	 0.0319	
90%	 0.0070	 0.0128	 0.0183	 0.0234	 0.0285	 0.0336	
2	
10%	 0.0071	 0.0136	 0.0191	 0.0247	 0.0300	 0.0358	
50%	 0.0059	 0.0113	 0.0167	 0.0217	 0.0267	 0.0316	
90%	 0.0069	 0.0126	 0.0181	 0.0232	 0.0283	 0.0333	
3	
10%	 0.0066	 0.0127	 0.0178	 0.0232	 0.0282	 0.0335	
50%	 0.0055	 0.0106	 0.0156	 0.0203	 0.0249	 0.0296	
90%	 0.0065	 0.0118	 0.0170	 0.0218	 0.0266	 0.0314	
4	
10%	 0.0056	 0.0106	 0.0149	 0.0196	 0.0237	 0.0283	
50%	 0.0047	 0.0089	 0.0131	 0.0171	 0.0210	 0.0250	
90%	 0.0055	 0.0101	 0.0145	 0.0186	 0.0227	 0.0268	
	
	
	
Table	7:	Estimated	parameters	and	 their	 standard	errors	 for	dataset	B.	The	 first	 row	shows	 the	estimated	
coefficients	of	the	model	applied	to	the	true	records	and	scenarios	1–4	show	the	estimated	coefficients	of	
the	model	applied	to	noisy	data	where	noise	with	variance	0.55	was	added	to	BMI	and	noise	with	variance	
0.05	 (scenario	 1),	 0.1	 (scenario	 2),	 0.2	 (scenario	 3)	 and	 0.5	 (scenario	 4)	 was	 added	 to	 the	 breastfeeding	
variable.	Note	that	the	response	variable	is	without	noise.	The	results	in	scenarios	1–4	show	the	means	of	50	
MCMC	simulations.	
Scenario	 Data	 𝛽!	(SE)	 𝛽!	(SE)	 𝛽!	(SE)	
	 True	data	 -1.261	(0.174)	 0.010	(0.010)	 -0.078	(0.058)	
1	 Noisy	data	 -1.256	(0.174)	 0.009	(0.010)	 -0.072	(0.054)	
2	 Noisy	data	 -1.250	(0.170)	 0.008	(0.011)	 -0.065	(0.070)	
3	 Noisy	data	 -1.325	(0.176)	 0.011	(0.010)	 -0.027	(0.036)	
4	 Noisy	data	 -1.330	(0.167)	 0.011	(0.010)	 -0.014	(0.026)	
	
	
Dataset	C	
Probabilistic	 anonymisation	 has	 been	 also	
applied	 to	 dataset	 C	 and	 the	 cumulative	
probabilities	for	h	at	different	percentiles	based	on	
100	 simulations	 are	 shown	 in	 table	 8.	 The	
difference	 in	dataset	C	 (in	contrast	with	datasets	A	
and	B)	is	the	outcome	variable,	which	is	continuous	
instead	 of	 binary,	 and	 therefore	 noise	 is	 added	 to	
the	outcome	in	the	same	way	as	the	noise	is	added	
to	any	continuous	explanatory	variables.	
For	 dataset	 C,	 the	 force	 expiratory	 volume	 in	 1	
second	 is	 regressed	 on	 BMI,	 sex	 and	 smoking	𝐹𝐸𝑉1 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐵𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽! 𝑆𝐸𝑋+ 𝛽! 𝑆𝑀𝑂𝐾𝐸                               3 	
The	 estimated	 coefficients	 with	 their	 standard	
errors	are	shown	in	table	9.	
We	 see	 from	 these	 example	 analyses	 that	 the	
disclosure	 risk	 increases	 with	 the	 number	 of	
identifying	 variables	 used,	 but	 remains	 acceptable.	
These	 results	 suggest	 that	 for	 similar	 datasets	 the	
amount	 of	 noise	 added	 could	 safely	 be	 reduced.	
Nevertheless,	 when	 a	 large	 number	 of	 variables	 is	
involved	in	a	dataset,	the	values	of	h-rank	index	will	
be	 expected	 to	 increase	 and	 this	 is	 clearly	 an	 area	
for	 further	 exploration.	 We	 also	 note	 that,	
especially	 for	 binary	 variables,	 estimates	 derived	
from	the	noisy	data	can	have	 large	standard	errors	
and	 the	 true	 estimates	 from	 the	 real	 data	 can	 be	
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very	 different.	 The	 amount	 of	 noise	 added	 to	 the	
binary	 variables	 in	 scenario	 4	 has	 a	 standard	
deviation	 0.5 = 0.71,	 which	 is	 very	 large	
compared	 to	 the	 range	 (0,1)	 of	 the	 true	 data	 and	
therefore	 we	 get	 a	 lot	 of	 instability	 (as	 25%	 of	
observed	 zeros	 get	 wrongly	 defined	 to	 their	 true	
category).	This	suggests	that	further	work	is	needed	
for	 such	 cases	 and	 table	 8	 suggests	 that	 smaller	
values	should	produce	acceptable	values	 for	h.	We	
conclude	 that	 for	 even	 low	 levels	 of	 noise	 the	
method	 is	 sufficient	 to	 effectively	 anonymise	 the	
records,	 but	we	 show	 the	 example	 of	 noise	 added	
to	the	binary	with	variance	0.5	as	a	warning	to	data	
managers	on	the	increase	in	the	loss	of	utility.	
	
	
	
Table	 8:	 Cumulative	 probabilities	 of	 h	 for	 noisy	 dataset	 C,	 at	 10th,	 50th	 and	 90th	 percentiles.	 Noise	 with	
variance	0.0069	was	added	to	the	outcome	FEV1	variable,	noise	with	variance	0.58	was	added	to	BMI	and	
noise	with	variance	0.05	(scenario	1),	0.1	(scenario	2),	0.2	(scenario	3)	and	0.5	(scenario	4)	was	added	to	sex	
and	smoke	indicators.	100	simulations	used.	
Scenario	 Percentile	 P(ℎ = 0)	 P(ℎ ≤ 1)	 P(ℎ ≤ 2)	 P(ℎ ≤ 3)	 P(ℎ ≤ 4)	 P(ℎ ≤ 5)	
1	
10%	 0.0204	 0.0377	 0.0522	 0.0661	 0.0785	 0.0896	
50%	 0.0206	 0.0371	 0.0514	 0.0644	 0.0761	 0.0866	
90%	 0.0209	 0.0375	 0.0522	 0.0650	 0.0768	 0.0874	
2	
10%	 0.0194	 0.0365	 0.0505	 0.0648	 0.0772	 0.0878	
50%	 0.0196	 0.0356	 0.0496	 0.0625	 0.0741	 0.0845	
90%	 0.0200	 0.0361	 0.0505	 0.0631	 0.0748	 0.0852	
3	
10%	 0.0179	 0.0332	 0.0463	 0.0591	 0.0708	 0.0807	
50%	 0.0180	 0.0327	 0.0457	 0.0575	 0.0685	 0.0782	
90%	 0.0183	 0.0332	 0.0465	 0.0582	 0.0691	 0.0789	
4	
10%	 0.0140	 0.0264	 0.0365	 0.0465	 0.0561	 0.0641	
50%	 0.0143	 0.0258	 0.0359	 0.0453	 0.0540	 0.0615	
90%	 0.0146	 0.0264	 0.0369	 0.0461	 0.0548	 0.0625	
	
	
	
Table	9:	Estimated	parameters	and	 their	 standard	errors	 for	dataset	C.	The	 first	 row	shows	 the	estimated	
coefficients	of	the	model	applied	to	the	true	records	and	scenarios	1–4	show	the	estimated	coefficients	of	
the	model	applied	to	noisy	data.	Noise	with	variance	0.0069	was	added	to	the	outcome	FEV1	variable,	noise	
with	variance	0.58	was	added	to	BMI	and	noise	with	variance	0.05	(scenario	1),	0.1	(scenario	2),	0.2	(scenario	
3)	 and	 0.5	 (scenario	 4)	 was	 added	 to	 sex	 and	 smoking	 indicators.	 The	 results	 in	 scenarios	 1–4	 show	 the	
means	of	50	MCMC	simulations.	
Scenario	 Data	 𝛽!	(SE)	 𝛽!	(SE)	 𝛽!	(SE)	 𝛽!	(SE)	
	 True	data	 1.139	(0.024)	 0.029	(0.001)	 0.105	(0.007)	 -0.005	(0.007)	
1	 Noisy	data	 1.145	(0.025)	 0.029	(0.001)	 0.096	(0.006)	 -0.004	(0.006)	
2	 Noisy	data	 1.140	(0.026)	 0.029	(0.001)	 0.051	(0.032)	 -0.005	(0.006)	
3	 Noisy	data	 1.182	(0.025)	 0.028	(0.001)	 0.051	(0.005)	 -0.004	(0.005)	
4	 Noisy	data	 1.194	(0.025)	 0.028	(0.001)	 0.031	(0.004)	 -0.001	(0.004)	
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Discussion	
We	 have	 shown	 how	 a	 probabilistic	
anonymisation	 procedure	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 data	
management	 procedures	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	
disclosure	risk	is	reduced	to	acceptable	levels	while	
retaining	the	ability	to	carry	out	statistical	analysis.	
The	 analysis	 conducted	 on	 the	 noisy,	 anonymous,	
data	 suffered	 some	 loss	 of	 statistical	 efficiency	
when	 compared	 with	 analysis	 on	 the	 true	 data;	 a	
consequence	 of	 which	 is	 enlarged	 confidence	
intervals	 and	 fewer	 significant	 inferences.	 Where	
the	variance	of	noise	added	to	the	binary	covariates	
is	 large	 (i.e.	 > 0.2),	 there	 is	 likely	 to	 be	
unacceptably	 high	 loss	 of	 statistical	 efficiency	 and	
for	binary	data	biases	may	also	be	introduced.	This	
example	 illustrates	 the	 challenge	 in	 balancing	
disclosure	control	with	retaining	data	utility.	
When	 considering	 disclosure	 risk,	 data	
custodians	 should	 consider	 the	 risk	 of	 motivated	
external	 attackers,	 accidental	 disclosure	 to	
authorised	 users	 and	 also	 the	 possible	
consequences	of	human	error.	 In	 the	 first	 scenario	
(external	 attacker)	 the	 attacker	 may	 be	motivated	
to	 identify	a	given	 individual	due	to	their	notoriety	
(for	 example	 an	 investigative	 journalist	 following	 a	
story	 or	 a	 researcher	 illustrating	 the	 fallacy	 of	
supposed	 ‘anonymity’	 (Sweeney,	 2002))	 or	 out	 of	
personal	interest.	In	the	second,	an	accredited	user	
or	 data	 custodian	 may	 recognise	 an	 individual	
during	 their	 legitimate	 work,	 and	 in	 the	 third	 an	
authorised	user	may	inadvertently	release	a	dataset	
to	a	wider	than	authorised	audience	through	a	data	
breach.	 In	 all	 these	 scenarios	 identification	 of	 a	
given	 data	 subject	 is	 likely	 to	 occur	 through	
matching	 known	 ‘real	world’	 information	 about	 an	
individual	to	equivalent	information	about	the	same	
individual	 within	 a	 dataset.	 Probabilistic	
anonymisation	 helps	 control	 for	 these	 risks	 by	
removing	certainty	about	whether	the	values	being	
considered	 in	 the	 noisy	 data	 are	 true	 ‘real	 world’	
values.	 The	 h-rank	 index	 disclosure	 measure	
proposed	 by	 Goldstein	 and	 Shlomo	 (Goldstein	 &	
Shlomo,	 2018),	 adopts	 this	 perspective	 by	 seeking	
to	establish	how	well	any	single	individual	is	‘hidden	
amongst	 the	 crowd’	of	 the	other	 individuals	 in	 the	
dataset.	 While	 this	 approach	 seems	 conceptually	
appropriate	 –	 it	 has	 some	 limitations.	 We	 found	
that,	in	its	current	state	of	development,	the	h-rank	
index	 was	 unable	 to	 adequately	 account	 for	
disclosure	risk	of	outliers	(this	was	acknowledged	by	
Goldstein	and	Shlomo	(Goldstein	&	Shlomo,	2018))	
but	 this	 can	 be	 addressed	 through	 suitable	 pre-
processing	 techniques	 such	 as	 truncating	 them.	 It	
was	also	unable	to	account	for	the	disclosure	risk	of	
clusters	 of	 individuals	 who	 all	 have	 the	 same	
outcome	 value,	 i.e.	 that	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	
identify	the	Individual	of	 Interest	within	the	cluster	
if	 they	all	have	 the	same	outcome	of	 interest.	This	
phenomenon	 is	 known	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 privacy	
literature	 (Machanavajjhala,	 Gehrke,	 Kifer,	 &	
Venkitasubramaniam,	 2006)	 and	 could	 be	
quantified	by	 including	 l-diversity	metrics	 to	assess	
outcome	 value	 diversity.	 Finally	we	 found	 that	 the	
h-rank	 index	 was	 also	 unable	 to	 account	 for	 the	
protective	 benefits	 of	 the	 sample	 being	 selected	
from	 a	 wider	 population	 (again	 a	 point	 noted	 by	
Goldstein	and	Shlomo	(Goldstein	&	Shlomo,	2018)).	
While	 this	 last	 point	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	
accommodate	 in	a	metric,	 it	could	be	 incorporated	
into	the	Data	Custodians	risk	assessment	process.	
In	practice,	a	data	custodian,	in	conjunction	with	
potential	 accredited	 users	would	 need	 to	 evaluate	
the	risks	associated	with	applying	any	given	amount	
of	 noise	 related	 to	 the	 potential	 loss	 of	 analysis	
efficiency.	In	some	cases,	it	may	not	be	desirable	to	
release	 data	 into	 the	 public	 domain.	 We	 suggest	
that	 there	 are	 few,	 if	 any,	 situations	 where	 some	
variables	 of	 interest	 would	 need	 to	 be	 excluded,	
though	 this	 remains	 an	 area	 for	 further	 study.	
However,	 our	 findings	 that	 large	 amounts	 of	 noise	
impact	model	 estimates	 suggest	 this	may	 limit	 the	
application	for	datasets	treated	with	large	amounts	
of	noise,	e.g.	they	may	be	suitable	only	for	training	
or	data	exploration	rather	than	applied	research.	A	
more	 realistic	 application	 would	 be	 the	 use	 of	
probabilistic	 anonymisation	 to	 applying	 limited	
amounts	 of	 noise	 (to	 protect	 against	 spontaneous	
recognition	 or	 contained	 (i.e.	 not	 public)	 data	
breaches)	and	to	supply	accredited	users	with	these	
noisy	data	under	controlled	‘safe	haven’	conditions.	
As	such,	probabilistic	anonymisation	will	add	to	the	
range	 of	 tools	 available	 to	 data	 managers	 that	
include	 manual	 data	 transformations	 (such	 as	
outlier	 suppression),	 statistical	 approaches	 (e.g.	
synthetic	 data	 and	 k-anonymisation)	 and	
distributed	 ‘black	 box’	 computing	 approaches	 (e.g.	
DataSHIELD	 (Wilson	 et	 al.,	 2017)).	 All	 such	
approaches	 involve	 trade-offs	 between	 disclosure	
control,	 impact	 on	 utility	 and	 impact	 on	 usability.	
Probabilistic	 anonymisation	 has	 one	 clear	
advantage	 over	 some	 of	 these	 approaches	 (e.g.	 k-
anonymisation	and	synthetic	data)	 in	 that	 it	allows	
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efficient	 and	 accurate	 data	 linkage	 to	 additional	
datasets,	 given	 that	 the	 noisy	 data	 can	 contain	 ID	
numbers	and	the	noise	can	be	applied	over	multiple	
datasets	 independently.	 Further	work	 is	needed	 to	
assess	the	extent	to	which	these	trade-offs	apply	in	
order	to	help	inform	the	Data	Custodian	community	
as	 to	 which	 approach	 may	 best	 fit	 any	 given	
situation.	
The	 software	 functions	 developed	 here	 are	
proof	 of	 principle	 rather	 than	 fully	 developed	
‘commercial	 grade’	 software.	 We	 have	 identified	
that	 improvements	 would	 be	 needed	 in	 the	
following	areas	before	wider	adoption:	1)	the	code	
needs	 to	 accommodate	 multi-category	 categorical	
variables;	 2)	 missing	 values	 are	 not	 currently	
supported,	we	need	to	allow	for	these	or	to	develop	
alternative	 approaches	 (e.g.	 imputation);	 3)	 the	 h-
rank	 index	 needs	 developing	 (as	 described	 above)	
and	 further	 consideration	given	 to	accommodating	
outlying	values	in	a	flexible	manner.		
We	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 probabilistic	
anonymisation	 can	 be	 effectively	 deployed	 to	 help	
control	for	disclosure	risk	while	producing	accurate	
estimates.	 We	 have	 assumed	 that	 the	 data	 to	 be	
used	is	for	bona-fide	research	scenarios	(i.e.	not	for	
releasing	 data	 into	 the	 public	 domain)	 where	
responsible	 and	 verifiable	 data	 security	 measures	
are	 in	 place.	 Additionally,	 this	 concept	 would	 be	
novel	 to	many	 data	 custodians	who	may	 not	 have	
advanced	 statistical	 expertise,	 so	 that	 determining	
the	 appropriate	 balance	 between	 disclosure	 risk	
control	 and	 retaining	 data	 utility	 would	 require	
training.	With	the	enhancements	we	have	identified	
the	software	assessed	here	could	be	developed	into	
a	 fully	 functional	 tool	 for	 Data	 Custodians.	 This	
software	would	be	a	useful	tool	to	help	longitudinal	
studies	maintain	participant	trust	and	to	share	data	
securely	 and	 effectively	 while	 meeting	 ever	 more	
stringent	data	protection	requirements.	
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